University of New Orleans

ScholarWorks@UNO
Department of Economics and Finance Working
Papers, 1991-2006

Department of Economics and Finance

1999

Intra-industry reactions of stock split announcements;
Oranee Tawatnuntachai
University of New Orleans

Ranjan D'Mello
University of New Orleans

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uno.edu/econ_wp

Recommended Citation
Tawatnuntachai, Oranee and D'Mello, Ranjan, "Intra-industry reactions of stock split announcements;"
(1999). Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers, 1991-2006. Paper 20.
https://scholarworks.uno.edu/econ_wp/20

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics and Finance at
ScholarWorks@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers,
1991-2006 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UNO. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@uno.edu.

Intra-Industry Reactions of Stock Split Announcements

Oranee Tawatnuntachai
Department of Economics and Finance
University of New Orleans
New Orleans, LA 70148
Tel. (504) 280-6096
Fax. (504) 280-6397
e-mail: oxtef@uno.edu

Ranjan D’Mello
Department of Economics and Finance
University of New Orleans
New Orleans, LA 70148
Tel. (504) 280-6900
Fax. (504) 280-6397
e-mail: rdmello@uno.edu

This draft: June, 1999

We wish to thank Thomas George, Jeffrey Harris, Sudha 1Krishnaswami, Neal Maroney, Tarun Mukherjee, Oscar
Varela, and Gerald Whitney for their valuable comments. All errors are our responsibility.

Intra-Industry Reactions of Stock Split Announcements
Abstract
This paper examines whether favorable information conveyed by stock split
announcements transfers to non-splitting firms within the same industry. We find that there exists
intra-industry reaction; shareholders of non-splitting firms experience significant positive abnormal
returns during the stock split announcement period of their industry counterparts. In addition, we
find that industry-wide (level of concentration) and firm-specific characteristics (degree of
similarity with the splitting firm, level of asymmetric information, and mispricing) are important
determinants in explaining the impact of the announcements on non-splitting firms. We further
document an increase in earnings subsequent to the announcements which is associated to the
stock price reactions. However, we find little evidence that there is a decline in earnings volatility
and find no significant relation between change in earnings volatility and announcement period
returns.

Intra-Industry Reactions of Stock Split Announcements

1. Introduction
A substantial amount of research shows that there is an association between equity value
of firms releasing information and that of non-releasing firms within the same industry. This
association, known as intra-industry reaction or information transfer, has been documented in
different contexts such as bankruptcy announcements (Aharony and Swary (1996), Lang and
Stulz (1992)), bond rating adjustments (Akhigbe, Madura and Whyte (1997)), dividend change
announcements (Firth (1996), Laux, Starks, Yoon (1998)), earnings announcements (Foster
(1981)), and securities offerings (Szewczyk (1992)). In this paper, we extend prior studies by
examining whether stock split announcements affect stock prices of non-splitting firms in the same
industry.
Prior literature documents that the market reacts favorably to the announcements of stock
splits and presents two major hypotheses to explain the positive stock returns.1 The information
content hypothesis suggests that stock splits reveal favorable information about cash dividend
and/or unusual earnings increases subsequent to the announcement.2

The trading range

hypothesis argues that firms who experience a run-up in stock prices split their stocks to move the
firms’ share price into an ‘optimum trading range’ thus improving trading liquidity.3

By

examining intra-industry reaction to stock split announcements, this study distinguishes between
these two hypotheses as motivations for stock splits. Since the trading range of non-splitting
firms’ stocks does not change, abnormal announcement period stock price reactions of these firms
cannot be attributed to enhanced liquidity but is consistent with the hypothesis that stocks splits
reveal information about future prospects of the industry.
In addition, stock splits are ideal experimental setting within which to examine the impact
of factors that affect market's inference about stock prices. The events that are studied in the
1

See Fama, Fisher, Jensen, Roll (1969), Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984), Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989),
Lamoureux and Poon (1987), Brennan and Copeland (1988), McNichols and Dravid (1990), Ikenberry, Rankine,
and Stice (1996), Pilotte and Manuel (1996), and Desai and Jain (1997).
2
See Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989), McNichols and Dravid (1990) and
Desai and Jain (1997).
3
See Baker and Gallagher (1980), Lakonishok and Lev (1987), Maloney and Mulherin (1992), Muscarella, and
Vetsuypens (1996), and Schultz (1999). A variation of this hypothesis is presented by Angel (1994) who argues
that firms split their stocks to attain an optimum tick size relative to the share price.

existing literature (e.g., dividends and earnings changes, bankruptcy announcements etc.) all have
direct cash flow implications for the announcing firm or its investors; and possibly for nonannouncers. Therefore, they convey information about past and current cash flow that was not
already public, as well as information about the firm’s future prospects. Stock splits are cosmetic
accounting changes with no direct impact on the announcer’s future cash flows or that of nonannouncers. Thus the stock split announcement period reactions for both the announcing and
non-announcing firms only reflect the market’s inference about the future prospects of these firms
conveyed by the event. This paper therefore provides a clean experiment to test hypotheses
relating to industry and firm-specific factors that affects information transfer about firms’ value
within an industry.
In examining intra-industry information transfers most prior studies document a net
contagion effect at the announcement of a corporate event, i.e., the stock price reaction for other
firms in the industry moves in the same direction as that of announcing firms. However, Lang and
Stulz (1992) and Laux, Starks, and Yoon (1998) argue that in highly concentrated industries
where competition for market share is high, certain events may trigger a change in the competitive
balance within the industry. Thus the announcements of these events will result in stock price
movements for other firms in the industry in a direction opposite to that of the announcing firm,
i.e., competitive effect. In this study we explain the diverse stock price reactions of non-splitting
firms at the announcements of stock splits.

We find that industry-wide and firm-specific

characteristics are important determinants of the differential impact of stock split announcements
on non-splitting firms.
Using a sample of 327 clean stock split announcements between 1986 to 1995, we find
that shareholders of non-splitting firms experience a significant increase in stock prices during the
announcement period.

This significant reaction suggests that there exists an intra-industry

reaction to stock split announcements supporting the information content hypothesis.

The

positive abnormal returns of non-splitting firms also indicate that information conveyed by the
announcements has a net contagion effect on the equity value of non-splitting firms.

The

contagion effect appears to be influenced by the degree of concentration within an industry.
Firms in industries with low level of concentration experience significantly higher returns than
those in industries with high level of concentration.
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We also find that firm-specific characteristics explain the differential industry-wide
reaction to stock split announcements. Consistent with Lang and Stulz (1992), we find that when
the degree of homogeneity proxied by earnings correlation between splitting and non-splitting
firms is high, non-splitting firms experience significant net contagion effects. Non-splitting firms
with high degree of asymmetric information captured by return variance have a more positive
stock price reaction than those firms where there is little or no asymmetric information. In
addition, we find that the degree of undervaluation proxied by book-to-market ratio matters; firms
that are more likely to be undervalued experience significant greater announcement period returns
than those classified as overvalued firms.
Further supporting evidence is provided by the results of cross-sectional regressions where
level of concentration, degree of similarity, level of asymmetric information and undervaluation
significantly affect the magnitude of intra-industry announcement period reactions. We also
document an increase in earnings of non-splitting firms subsequent to stock split announcements
and the earnings change is positively associated with stock price reactions of non-splitting firms.
These findings suggest that investors react positively to non-splitting firms in anticipation of
earnings increases following the announcement.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the contagion and
competitive effects, the different industry and firm-specific factors that would affect non-splitting
firms and develops hypotheses relating to intra-industry reactions. Section 3 describes data
selection and matching process. Section 4 analyzes the results and section 5 summarizes and
concludes the paper.

2. Intra-Industry Reactions of Stocks Split Announcements
2.1. Contagion and Competitive Effects
Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989), McNichols and
Dravid (1990) and Desai and Jain (1997) indicate that stock splits reveal favorable future
information.

Prior literature also finds evidence that stock splits are followed by abnormal

increases in dividends and/or earnings. While a stock split results in an increase in stock price for
the splitting firm, it might also reveal information about the industry in general. The direction of
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the industry stock price movement will depend on whether the information revealed has a net
contagion or competitive effect on non-splitting firms.
Foster (1981) and Szewczyk (1992) argue that because of homogeneity of firms within the
industry, information released by a firm causes the market to reevaluate the value of both
announcing and non-announcing firms in the same direction. Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989)
document that firms that announce stock splits are in industries that experience abnormally high
earnings growth during the announcement year. They suggest that the similarity of firms within
the splitting firm industry is the reason for the unusual earnings increases across all firms in the
industry on average. Therefore, the positive information revealed by split announcements could
generate a significant increase in share prices for splitting as well as non-splitting firms. The
positive reaction for non-splitting firms is called ‘contagion’ effect.
However, stock splits may provide a negative impact on non-splitting firms and cause their
stock prices to fall. This effect is more pronounced for industries with imperfect competition
where the announcement of an event reveals comparative information about other firms in the
industry. For example, the performance of non-splitting firms could be perceived as ‘poor’
relative to the superior performance of splitting firms.

At the extreme, wealth could be

redistributed from non-splitting firms to the splitting firm. Hence, a positive split signal of one
firm may convey unfavorable information for other firms in the industry. This negative reaction is
called ‘competitive’ effect.4
The contagion and competitive effects are not mutually exclusive and thus the observed
stock price reaction is the sum of these two effects. Either a significant positive or negative
reaction for non-splitting firms indicates that stock split announcements are not only firm-specific
events but impact the industry as well. A positive reaction suggests that non-splitting firms gain
from stock split announcements of their industry counterparts implying a net contagion effect.
Alternatively, a negative reaction for the non-splitting firms suggests that these firms experience a
net competitive effect, i.e., the announcement of a stock split by an industry firm reveals an
overall unfavorable information for non-splitting firms. The finding of significant announcement
returns for non-splitting firms suggests that stock splits are employed to reveal information as
opposed to increasing trading liquidity. Finally, if the stock price reaction is not significant, one
4

For more details, see Lang and Stulz (1992).
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of the following three possibilities might explain the result. First, stock split announcements may
reveal only firm-specific information and thus not have an industry-wide effect. Second, stock
splits have an intra-industry effect but the positive (contagion) effects for some firms cancel the
negative (competitive) effects for other firms in the industry resulting in an insignificant reaction.
Third, the main motive for stock splits may not be to reveal information, but rather to increase
liquidity by moving share prices into the ‘normal’ range.

2.2. Industry and Firm-Specific Characteristics Influencing Intra-Industry Reactions
In this section we examine the impact of industry and firm-specific factors on the market’s
perception of change in non-splitting firms’ equity value at the stock split announcement. As
stated earlier, unlike prior studies that examine intra-industry effects for events with strong
current and future cash flow implications, this study tests the market’s inference of non-splitting
firm’s stock value from an event that is purely accounting in nature. Thus this study provides a
uncontaminated setting to test of how the market incorporates these factors in pricing securities
while reacting to a corporate event.

2.2.1 Industry Reactions and Industry Characteristics
Lang and Stulz (1992) argue that in highly concentrated industries where the competition
for market share among firms is high, the competitive effect is more pronounced. Thus a stock
split announcement by a firm in highly concentrated industries is more likely to reveal unfavorable
information about its competitors, causing a shift in the competitive balance within the industry.
Therefore, relative to non-splitting firms in low concentrated industries, firms in highly
concentrated industries are expected to experience less positive returns from stock split
announcements of their industry counterparts. We would anticipate a negative relation between
announcement period returns of non-splitting firms and the degree of concentration within the
industry.

2.2.2. Industry Reactions and Firm-Specific Factors
(i) Degree of Similarity

5

Foster (1981), Lang and Stulz (1992), and Firth (1996) find that abnormal returns of nonannouncing firms whose characteristics are closely related to those of the announcing firms are
larger than the abnormal returns of non-announcing firms whose characteristics are dissimilar.
They argue that this result is consistent with greater intra-industry information transfer for firms
with similar characteristics that are affected by common factors. Their results would imply stock
split announcements will affect non-splitting firms with a high degree of similarity to splitting
firms more than those with low degree of similarity. This suggests a positive relation between
abnormal returns of non-splitting firms and degree of similarity between splitting and non-splitting
firms.

(ii) Level of Asymmetric Information for Non-Splitting Firms
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) find
significantly higher stock price reactions at the announcement of stock splits for firms classified as
having high level of information asymmetry relative to other splitting firms. They conclude that
for these firms, stock splits reveal more information.

If stock splits reveal industry-wide

information, their findings will imply that non-splitting firms that have a high level of asymmetric
information will experience a greater impact from the announcement than other firms in the
industry. This would predict a positive relation between abnormal returns for non-splitting
industry firms and the degree of asymmetric information.

(iii)

Degree of Underpricing for Non-Splitting Firms
Fama and French (1992) find that stocks with high book relative to their market value (i.e.

value stocks) outperform those with low book relative to the market value (i.e. glamour stocks).
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) find evidence consistent with Fama and French (1992).
They further show that earnings growth for value stocks are significantly higher than glamour
stocks and argue that high (low) book-to-market ratio stocks are underpriced (overpriced). If
book-to-market is a measure of the degree of undervaluation and stock splits reveals information
about the industry, undervalued firms would be affected more from the announcements than
overvalued firms. This suggests that returns of non-splitting firms will be positively related to
book-to-market ratio.

6

3. Data Selection and Matching Process
3.1. Data Selection
The sample used in this study is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) tape and is cross-referenced with the Wall Street Journal Index.5 There are 4,497 stock
distributions, i.e., stock splits and stock dividends announced during the period of 1986 to 1995.
Following Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984), we delete stock distributions with split factor
(defined as the number of additional shares per existing share) less than or equal to 0.25 (600
observations). Similar to Lang and Stulz (1992) we assign firms to an industry group on the
primary four-digit SIC codes obtained from Compustat. We exclude firms whose (a) four-digit
SIC code is not available (452 observations), (b) SIC code begins with 49- and 6- (992
observations) representing public utilities and financial institutions since these firms are regulated
and thus their announcements convey little information (Asquith and Mullins (1986) and
Szewczyk (1992)), and (c) shares are not traded on major exchanges (i.e. AMEX, NASDAQ or
NYSE, 65 observations).
Foster (1980) argues that the amount of information is inversely related to the sequence of
information releases. Pilotte and Manuel (1996) examine firms that conduct multiple stock splits
and find evidence consistent with Foster (1980), suggesting that the market reacts more positively
to the first stock split than to subsequent announcements. Therefore, to focus on stock splits that
are expected to convey the greatest amount of industry-wide information, we exclude splits
conducted less than one year from the previous stock split announced by a firm in the same
industry (1,607 observations).6

Similar to Firth (1996) we eliminate 436 observations with

contemporaneous announcements over the announcement period. We also drop firms that do not
have return information during the announcement period window and firms with no industry
matches. The final sample consists of 327 stock splits announced during 1986 to 1995.

3.2. Matching Process
5

The split data is from CRSP tape distribution code 5523.
Other studies relating to information transfers have also eliminated observations having low industry-wide
information (Lang and Stulz (1992), Szewczyk (1992) and Firth (1996)). We find that the announcement period
6
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The non-splitting firms include all other firms (both active and research firms) listed on
Compustat that satisfy the following criteria:
1. They have the same four-digit SIC code as splitting firms.
2. Their shares are traded on AMEX, NASDAQ or NYSE.
3. A five-day announcement period return is available on CRSP.
4. They do not announce stock splits within an eleven-day period centered around day 0 of the
splitting firm announcement.7
The last criterion ensures that stock splits announced by matching firms during the event
window are not a possible cause for the significant results for these firms. There are 3,684 nonsplitting firms in 199 different four-digit SIC codes. The average (median) number of nonsplitting firms for each splitting firm is 11.26 (7) with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 66.
Only 3 observations have more than 50 matching firms.

4. Empirical Results
4.1. Abnormal Returns of Non-Splitting Firms
Similar to Aharony and Swary (1996) and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) we use
five-day cumulative abnormal returns calculated from day -2 to +2 relative to the announcement
day to measure the announcement period returns for both splitting and non-splitting firms. The
abnormal returns are defined as returns in excess of the value-weighted market returns.8 Table 1
presents the results of abnormal returns for both splitting and non-splitting firms. The splitting
firms experience significant daily excess returns during the stock split announcement period.
Consistent with Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) we document a significant average five-day
cumulative announcement period of 3.82 percent. This result confirms the conclusion of prior
studies that stock splits are considered ‘good’ news thus resulting in an increase in equity value at
the announcements.
As stated earlier the effect of stock split announcements on non-splitting firms in the
industry is the sum of two effects: (a) the contagion effect where shareholders of non-splitting

returns for non-splitting firms at the announcement of the second split within an industry is lower relative to the
first split.
7
This process is similar to Firth (1996). The results are robust to the window used.
8
See Bar-Yosef and Brown (1977) and Brown and Warner (1985).
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firms benefit from favorable information conveyed by the announcements and (b) the competitive
effect where split announcements reveal comparative unfavorable information for non-splitting
firms in the industry causing stock prices of these firms to decline. Observing a significant intraindustry reaction suggests that information conveyed by the stock split announcement transfers to
non-splitting firms within the same industry indicating that these announcements are associated
with revealing industry-wide information rather than enhancing liquidity.
To test the impact of stock splits on non-splitting firm we examine the abnormal returns
for non-splitting firms around the split announcement date. However, since the announcement
period for a given split is the same for all non-splitting firms in an industry, there is a correlation
of returns problem that results in biased test statistics. To control for this 'clustering problem' we
form an equally-weighted portfolio of all non-splitting firms in the same industry for each split.
Thus the abnormal returns for non-splitting firms are portfolio abnormal returns as opposed to
individual abnormal returns. The results presented in table 1 suggest that over the announcement
period window the mean five-day cumulative return for non-splitting firms is 0.34 percent,
significant at the 10 percent level.9 The small but significantly positive abnormal announcement
period returns suggests that an intra-industry reaction exists in the context of stock split
announcements. Since the announcement of a stock split does not impact the trading range of
non-splitting firms’ stocks, the significant announcement period returns for these firms are
consistent with the information content hypothesis that stock splits reveal information. A positive
reaction of non-splitting firms also indicates that favorable information conveyed by stock split an
announcement has a net positive impact on non-splitting firms in the same industry. These results
support the finding of previous studies that the market reevaluates the value of announcing firms
and that of non-announcing firms in the same direction (Foster (1981) and Szewczyk (1992)).

4.2. Industry Reactions and Industry and Firm-Specific Characteristics
4.2.1. Industry Reactions and Level of Concentration
Lang and Stulz (1992) document that the competitive effect is more pronounced in highly
concentrated industries where the competition among firms is high; stock splits announced by a

9

We eliminate an outlier where the abnormal return exceeded 300 percent. Inclusion of this observation does not
significantly alter the results.
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firm tend to reveal comparative information about non-splitting firms within the industry resulting
in less positive returns for these firms. In this section, we test whether non-splitting firms in low
concentrated industries benefit more from stock split announcements than those in highly
concentrated industries. Consistent with Lang and Stulz (1992) and Laux, Starks, and Yoon
(1998), we use Herfindahl Index (HI) to measure the degree of concentration within an industry.
We calculate HI by summing square market share of each firm relative to all other firms with the
four-digit SIC code. Market share is defined as the firm’s annual sales at the fiscal-year end prior
to the stock split announcement as a percentage of industry sales. A low (high) HI indicates a low
(high) level of concentration and hence a low (high) degree of competition among firms. We
follow the Antitrust Guidelines by the Department of Justice which uses Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HHI) as a quantitative measurement of concentration level in defining highly concentrated
industries. The Department of Justice classifies an industry with HHI greater than 1,800 to be a
highly concentrated industry.10
Table 2 presents abnormal returns for the portfolio of non-splitting firms partitioned by
Herfindahl index. For low concentrated industries, stock prices of non-splitting firms increase
significantly by 0.73 percent compared to 0.16 percent for non-splitting firms in highly
concentrated industries. The test statistic for the difference in mean returns between firms in high
and low concentrated industries is significant at the 10 percent level. These results suggest that
the level of concentration is an important determinant of the cross-sectional variation in
announcement period returns for non-splitting firms; non-splitting firms in highly concentrated
industries experience lower benefits from stock split announcements than those in low
concentrated industries and is consistent with the findings of Stulz (1992) and Laux, Starks, and
Yoon (1998).

4.2.2. Industry Reactions and Similarity of Earnings
Foster (1981) and Lang and Stulz (1992) find evidence suggesting that the contagion
effect is more pronounced for non-announcing firms with high degree of similarity to announcing
firms. Foster (1981) reasons that an announcement of a firm conveys more information for non-

10

rd

HHI is calculated by summing over the largest 50 firms in the industry. See Parkin 3 edition.

10

announcing firms that display similar characteristics to the announcing firm than for those whose
characteristics are different. Their findings predict that non-splitting firms with high degree of
similarity to splitting firms gain more from stock split announcements of their industry
counterparts than those with low degree of similarity.
Since Firth (1996) suggests that firms that are similar to each other have a high correlation
of earnings we use earnings correlation as a measure of the degree of similarity between firms. To
eliminate the effects of capital structure and taxes, we compute earnings correlation of annual
earnings before interest and taxes for ten years preceding the stock split announcement. A nonsplitting firm is considered ‘highly similar’ (‘highly dissimilar’) to a splitting firm if their earnings
correlation is greater than or equal to (less than) the sample median correlation of 0.20.
Table 3, panel A, presents the results when non-splitting firms are partitioned by degree of
similarity. We find that the mean abnormal returns for the sub-sample of non-splitting firms
portfolios whose earnings correlation is less than the sample median (i.e., dissimilar firms) is –0.34
percent. For non-splitting firms portfolios that are ‘highly similar’ to the announcing firm there is
an increase in stock price of 0.26 percent in stock. Furthermore, the difference in mean abnormal
returns between the two groups is significant at the 5 percent level. These results indicate that
stock split announcements reveal more information to non-splitting firms with high degree of
similarity to the splitting firm and is consistent with the findings of Foster (1981) and Lang and
Stulz (1992).
We also examine whether the results presented in panel A are affected by the industry
level of concentration. To test this hypothesis, the sample is divided into four cells based on the
medians of Herfindahl index (proxying level of concentration) and earnings correlation (proxying
degree of similarity). Abnormal returns for each of the four cells is the average market-adjusted
excess returns of equally-weighted portfolios grouped by industry and event date. Prior results
would suggest that firms that are classified as being similar (dissimilar) and in less (highly)
concentrated industries would gain (lose) the most from the split announcement.
The results are presented in panel B. For firms in low concentrated industries with high
degree of similarity to the splitting firm (group a) experience a stock price increase of 0.46
percent, the highest of the four cells. In contrast, the mean stock price of non-splitting firms in
highly concentrated industries whose earnings correlation is low (group b) declines by a
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significant 0.65 percent. Furthermore the test statistic for the difference in mean returns between
these two groups is also significant at the 1 percent level. In addition, the pattern of difference
among sub-samples support earlier conclusions that both level of concentration and degree of
similarity are significant variables in determining the reaction of non-splitting firms. For high
concentrated industries, the abnormal return for non-splitting firms that are similar to the splitting
firm is statistically higher than that for dissimilar non-splitting firms. For low concentrated
industries the difference in mean returns between high and low earnings correlation, although
correct in direction, is not statistically significant.

Similarly, controlling for the degree of

similarity, we find that markets react more positively to non-splitting firms in less concentrated
industries than those in highly concentrated industries and this effect is most pronounced for
dissimilar firms.

4.2.3. Industry Reactions and Level of Asymmetric Information
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) and Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) suggest
that the market reacts more strongly to stock split announcements of firms that have high
asymmetric information level because the announcements reveal more information. Consequently,
it is hypothesized that intra-industry reaction to a stock split announcement will convey more
information for non-splitting firms who have high level of asymmetric information. Since stock
splits convey positive information for non-splitting firms, this would imply that shareholders of
non-splitting firms with high level of information asymmetry gain significantly more than firms
who have low asymmetric information.
The level of asymmetric information is measured by return variance (RVAR) defined as
the variance of CRSP value-weighted market-adjusted return computed for the year preceding
stock split announcements. Dierkens (1991) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1998) suggest
that volatility in residual stock returns captures the degree of information asymmetry.11 Firms
with RVAR greater than or equal to the median sample firm are classified as firms with high level
of asymmetric information. Alternatively we classify firms as having low asymmetric information
if RVAR is less than the sample median.
11

Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1998) report that the correlation between volatility in residual stock returns
and other measures of information asymmetry (e.g., analysts’ earnings forecast error, volatility in abnormal returns
around earnings announcements etc.) is greater than 0.4.
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In panel A of table 4 we present results for two groups of non-splitting firms classified by
RVAR. For the sub-sample of firms where the level of information asymmetry is high, the equity
value of non-splitting firms increases by 1.32 percent (significant at 1 percent level) on average.
For non-splitting firms with low asymmetric information level, there is a statistically insignificant
decrease in stock price of 0.08 percent. The t-statistic for the difference in mean returns between
high and low asymmetric information level sub-samples is significant at 5 percent level. These
findings support the hypothesis that firms with high level of asymmetric information gain
significantly more from the stock split announcement than those with low information asymmetry.
We also test whether the results reported in Panel A persist after controlling for industry
level of concentration. To test this hypothesis, we classify the sample into four cells by the level
of information asymmetry (RVAR) and the industry level of concentration (HI). Results are
presented in panel B of Table 4. As predicted, the mean return is highest (1.63 percent) for firms
with a high degree of information asymmetry in low concentrated industries (group a). For firms
with low level of information asymmetry and in highly concentrated industries (group b), the
average change in equity value is –0.20 percent. The t-statistic for the difference in mean returns
between these two groups is highly significant. Consistent with earlier univariate results, we find
that both concentration level and asymmetric information level are significant determinants of
intra-industry reactions. Controlling for the level of industry concentration, we find that firms
with high level of asymmetric information experience higher returns than firms with low level of
asymmetric information. Similarly, controlling for the level of information asymmetry, we find
that firms in highly concentrated industries experience lower returns than those in less
concentrated industries although the differences are statistically weak.

4.2.4. Industry Reactions and Degree of Undervaluation
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) and Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996)
suggest that book-to-market (B/M) ratio is a proxy for degree of undervaluation. They argue that
firms that have high B/M ratio are more likely to be undervalued. Having documented that stock
splits reveal significant amount of intra-industry information, we hypothesize that industry firms
that are most likely to be undervalued (overvalued) will experience a greater (smaller) change in
stock prices at the stock split announcement of their industry counterpart.
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We test this hypothesis by dividing firms based on the degree of undervaluation and
compare the returns between the sub-samples of firms that are most likely to be overvalued and
undervalued. Consistent with Lakonishok, et al. (1994) and Ikenberry, et al. (1996) we use B/M
ratio to proxy the degree of undervaluation. B/M is defined as the book value of assets divided by
the book value of assets plus the difference between market and book value of equity as of the
year-end prior to the split announcement.12 Firms are classified as undervalued (overvalued) if the
B/M ratio exceeds or equals (less than) the sample median.13
The results are provided in Table 5. We find that firms that are most likely to be
undervalued experience a significant (10 percent level) increase in stock prices of 0.45 percent at
the announcement of the stock split. For firms that have a low B/M ratio, the announcement
period return is negative but insignificantly different from 0. The difference in mean returns
between the two groups is significant indicating that the degree of undervaluation is important in
explaining the variation in announcement period variations of non-splitting industry firms. We
also test whether these results hold after controlling for industry characteristics by dividing the
sample into four cells by Herfindahl index (HI) and B/M ratio. The results are presented in Table
5, panel B. Non-splitting firms in the sub-sample where B/M ratio exceeds or equals to the
sample median and HI is less than the sample median experience the greatest abnormal returns of
1.14 percent. On the other hand, non-splitting firms with low B/M ratio in highly concentrated
industries earn the lowest abnormal returns of –0.57 percent. The difference in mean returns
between these two sub-samples is statistically significant (1 percent level). These results also
suggest that B/M ratio and HI are significant determinants in explaining the stock price reactions
of non-splitting firms.

4.3. Multivariate Analysis
To confirm earlier univariate results we regress five-day cumulative returns of nonsplitting firms on the level of concentration, degree of similarity, level of information asymmetry,
and degree of undervaluation. In addition, we use five-day cumulative market-adjusted return of
splitting firms and split factor as additional explanatory variables. Firth (1996) suggests that there

12
13

The similar results are obtained when B/M is defined as book relative to market value of equity.
We obtain stronger results if we use B/M ratio of 1 to classify over and undervalued firms.
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is association between returns of announcing and non-announcing firms. McNichols and Dravid
(1990) report the positive relationship between split factor and level of information revealed by
splitting firms. We run two sets of regressions; one with individual firms and the other with nonsplitting firms grouped into equally-weighted portfolios by industry for each split. In Table 6 we
present regression results for individual firms only; the results for portfolios (327 observations)
are similar and hence not reported.
In models 1-2, we test whether the level of concentration, degree of similarity, level of
information asymmetry, and degree of undervaluation affect announcement period returns of the
non-splitting firms. Consistent with the univariate analysis presented earlier we find significantly
positive coefficients for earnings correlation, return variance, and book-to-market ratio and a
significantly negatively coefficient for Herfindahl index. These results suggest that non-splitting
firms in low concentrated industries and those that are similar to splitting firms gain significantly
from stock split announcements. Similarly non-splitting firms that have high level of asymmetric
information and those that are undervalued also experience higher returns from the
announcements. Further, returns of non-splitting firms are positively related to those of splitting
firms but the slope coefficient is not significant.

These findings provide strong supportive

evidence that the industry characteristics (level of concentration) and firm-specific factors (degree
of similarity, level of asymmetric information and undervaluation) explain the cross-sectional
variation in returns for non-splitting firms at the announcements of stock splits.
In models 3-4 we further investigate the magnitude of information transfer by regressing
non-splitting firms abnormal returns against the four factors interacted with the splitting firm’s
announcement period return. Consistent with the results presented earlier we find that level of
concentration, degree of similarity, level of asymmetric information and undervaluation are
significant explanators of the degree of information transfer. We also find that stock splits by
large firms transfer more information; the coefficient is positive and highly significant.

4.4. Change in Earnings Subsequent to Stock Split Announcements
The results presented thus far suggest that stock split announcements reveal industry-wide
information; non-splitting firms in the same industry experience positive returns at the split
announcement period. The effect is most pronounced for firms (a) that are in less concentrated
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industries (b) that are similar to splitting firms (c) that have high level of information asymmetry
(d) or that are undervalued. In this section we test whether there is a relation between investors’
revision in non-splitting firms’ value and subsequent operating performance.
Asquith, Healy, and Palepu (1989) find that stock split announcements convey favorable
information about future earnings changes.

Similarly, McNichols and Dravid (1990) find a

positive relation between announcement period returns and subsequent earnings increases for
splitting firms. These results coupled with the evidence presented earlier that stock splits reveal
favorable industry-wide information predict an increase in earnings performance for non-splitting
firms subsequent to the announcements.

Further, if investors react to non-splitting firms

anticipating an increase in future earnings, abnormal returns of non-splitting firms should be
positively associated with subsequent earnings change.
To test this hypothesis, we examine the change in earnings for both short- and long-run.
Short- (long-) run earnings change is defined as the change in earnings from a year (three years)
subsequent to a year prior to the announcement. We use two earnings measures; earning-pershare (net income available to shareholders per share) standardized by share price at the year-end
prior to the announcement and operating earnings defined as earnings before interest and taxes
standardized by book value of total assets at the year-end prior to the announcement. Consistent
with the abnormal return results, we group non-splitting firms into equally-weighted portfolios by
industry for each split announcement.
Table 7 presents evidence of portfolio earnings changes for the non-splitting firms. In
panel A we observe that non-splitting firms experience a significant increase in earnings
subsequent to stock split announcements. The mean short- (long-) run increase in earnings-pershare is 3.35 (8.00) percent and highly significant.

Similarly, there is an increase in earnings

before interest and taxes of 1.73 (4.89) percent in the short- (long-) run. These findings support
the hypothesis that stock split announcements reveal favorable information about industry-wide
earning changes for both the short- and the long-run.
Panel B presents results for the test of the relation between the investors’ revision in nonsplitting firm value at the announcement of the stock split and future earnings performance of
these firms. The dependent variable is the five-day abnormal returns for non-splitting firms and
the independent variables are the short- and long-run changes in earnings-per-share and earnings
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before interest and taxes. As hypothesized, there is an association between returns of nonsplitting firms and increases in earnings subsequent to stock split announcements. The coefficient
for the short- (long-) run earnings-per-share change and returns is 0.04 (0.01), significant at 1 (5)
percent. For the earnings before interest and taxes measure, we find a significant coefficient for
the long-run earnings change only. In the short-run the coefficient is positive (correct direction)
but statistically weak. Overall the results presented in Table 7 suggest that non-splitting firms in
the same industry as splitting firms experience a significant improvement in short- and long-run
earnings performance subsequent to the stock split announcement of their industry counterpart.
Furthermore investors, anticipating an improvement in future operating performance of the
industry, react positively to non-splitting firms during the split announcement period.

5. Summary and Conclusion
This paper examines whether stock split announcements affect stocks prices of nonsplitting firms in the same industry. The results indicate that shareholders of non-splitting firms
experience a significant 0.34 percent increase in equity value during the stock split announcement
period of their industry counterparts. This finding coupled with the positive abnormal returns of
splitting firms suggests that the favorable information conveyed by stock split announcements
transfers to non-splitting firms within the same industry. The existence of intra-industry reaction
is also consistent with the information content (as opposed to the trading range) hypothesis.
Further, non-splitting firms in low concentrated industries measured by Herfindahl index
gain more from split announcements than those in highly concentrated industries. This finding
suggests that the positive reaction of non-splitting firms is more pronounced in low concentrated
industries. In addition, non-splitting firms whose degree of similarity to splitting firms measured
by earnings correlation is high experience significantly higher stock returns than those with low
degree of similarity. This result is consistent with Firth (1996) that the announcements convey
more favorable information for non-announcing firms whose earnings are highly correlated to
splitting firms.
Non-splitting firms with high asymmetric information measured by return variance also
earn significantly higher abnormal returns than those with low asymmetric information. This
indicates that the higher the information asymmetry level, the greater the positive intra-industry
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reaction. In addition, the mean equity value of non-splitting firms with high book-to-market ratio
is significantly higher than that of non-splitting firms with low book-to-market ratio. This finding
suggests that firms with high book relative to market value are undervalued and thus benefit from
the announcements more than those with low book relative to market value.
In addition, the regression results indicate that abnormal returns of non-splitting firms are
negatively related to Herfindahl index and positively related to earnings correlation, return
variance and book-to-market ratio. The slope coefficients of these factors are significant even
after controlling for other factors. Finally we find an improvement in earnings performance for
non-splitting firms both in the short- and the long-run and the announcement period returns for
these firms are positively related to the earnings changes. We conclude that stock split conveys
favorable industry-wide information about earnings improvement and industry characteristics and
firm-specific factors are significant determinants in explaining these stock price reactions.
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Table 1
Abnormal Returns for Splitting and Non-Splitting Firms at the Announcements of Stock
Splits
This table presents mean abnormal returns for 327 firms that announce stock splits and portfolios
of 3,684 non-splitting firms. Abnormal returns are value-weighted market-adjusted returns. The
non-splitting firms are firms listed on Compustat that have the same four-digit SIC code as
splitting firms, whose shares are traded on major exchanges and do not announce stock splits
during an eleven-day period centered around stock split announcement day (day 0). The
portfolios of non-splitting firms are equally weighted grouped for each event. ***,**, and *
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Splitting Firms

Non-Splitting Firms

(Period)
N

Mean
(%)

t-statistic

N

Mean
(%)

t-statistic

(-20,-3)

327

7.08

9.80***

327

1.29

2.80***

(-2,+2)

327

3.82

9.26***

327

0.34

1.75*

(+3,+20)

327

2.73

4.82***

327

-0.22

-0.56
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Table 2
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns For Non-Splitting Firms Classified by Level of
Concentration
This table presents mean five-day cumulative value-weighted market-adjusted returns for nonsplitting firms classified by level of concentration. Level of concentration is measured by
Herfindahl Index (HI) defined as the sum of square market share of each firm in the four-digit SIC
code. The market share is firm’s annual sales at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement as
a percentage of industry sales. The non-splitting firms are grouped into equally weighted
portfolios of all firms in the same industry as the splitting firm for each stock split. The t-statistic
and the numbers of portfolios are in parenthesis and square brackets respectively. The last row
presents the t-statistic for the statistical difference in mean between the two sub-samples. ***,**,
and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
HI

Abnormal Returns

≤ 1,800

0.73
(2.14**)
[102]

> 1,800

0.16
(0.59)
[225]

t-statistic

1.71*
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Table 3
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns For Non-Splitting Firms Classified by
Degree of Similarity and Level of Concentration
This table presents mean five-day value-weighted market-adjusted returns for non-splitting firms
classified by degree of similarity. Earnings correlation (CORR) is the correlation of earnings
before interest and taxes for a ten-year period preceding the announcement and is a measure of
degree of similarity between splitting and non-splitting firms. Level of concentration is measured
by Herfindahl Index (HI) and is the sum of square market share, proxied by firm’s annual sales at
the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement as a percentage of industry sales, of each firm in the
four-digit SIC code. Non-splitting firms are grouped into equally-weighted portfolios for each
industry for each event. The t-statistics are in parenthesis and the numbers of portfolios are in
square brackets. The test statistic for difference in mean returns between two sub-samples is in
the last row. The t-statistic at the lower right hand corner in Panel B is for the difference in mean
returns between sub-samples a (i.e., firms that are similar and in less concentrated industries) and b
(i.e., firms that are dissimilar and in highly concentrated industries). ***,**, and * denote
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Similarity of Earnings
CORR

Abnormal Returns

≤ Median

-0.34
(-1.52)
[271]

> Median

0.26
(1.25)
[283]

t-statistic

-1.96**

Panel B: Similarity of Earnings and Level of Concentration
CORR
HI

> Median

≤ Median

t-statistic

0.23
(0.77)
[96]

0.54

≤ 1,800

0.46a
(1.58)
[93]

-0.65b
(-2.17**)
[175]

2.00**

> 1,800

0.17
(0.60)
[190]

t-statistic

0.72

2.08**

2.65***
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Table 4
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns For Non-Splitting Firms Classified by
Level of Asymmetric Information and Level of Concentration
This table presents mean five-day cumulative value-weighted market-adjusted returns for nonsplitting firms classified by level of asymmetric information. Information asymmetry is measured
by the return variance (RVAR) of market-adjusted returns in the year preceding the stock split
announcement day. Level of concentration is measured by Herfindahl Index (HI) and is the sum
of square market share, proxied by firm’s annual sales at the fiscal year-end prior to the
announcement as a percentage of industry sales, of each firm in the four-digit SIC code. Nonsplitting firms are grouped into equally-weighted portfolios for each industry for each event. The
t-statistics are in parenthesis and the numbers of portfolios are in square brackets. The test
statistic for difference in mean returns between two sub-samples is in the last row. The t-statistic
at the lower right hand corner in Panel B is for the difference in mean returns between subsamples a (i.e., firms with high levels of asymmetric information and in less concentrated
b
industries) and (i.e., firms with low levels of asymmetric information and in highly concentrated
industries). ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Degree of Asymmetric Information
RVAR

Abnormal Returns

≤ Median

-0.08
(-0.33)
[270]

> Median

1.32
(2.53***)
[238]

t-statistic

-2.43***

Panel B: Level of Concentration and Degree of Asymmetric Information
RVAR
HI

> Median

≤ Median

t-statistic

0.15
(0.51)
[92]

1.76*

≤ 1,800

1.63 a
(2.06**)
[89]

-0.20 b
(-0.58)
[178]

1.73*

> 1,800

1.13
(1.65*)
[149]

t-statistic

0.48

0.78

2.13**

25

Table 5
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns For Non-Splitting Firms Classified by
Degree of Undervaluation and Level of Concentration
This table presents mean five-day value-weighted market-adjusted returns for non-splitting firms
classified by book-to-market (B/M) ratio. B/M is the ratio of book value of assets to book value
of asset plus the difference between market and book value of equity. Level of concentration is
measured by Herfindahl Index (HI) and is the sum of square market share, proxied by firm’s
annual sales at the fiscal year-end prior to the announcement as a percentage of industry sales, of
each firm in the four-digit SIC code. Non-splitting firms are grouped into equally-weighted
portfolios for each industry for each event. The t-statistics are in parenthesis and the numbers of
portfolios are in square brackets. The test statistic for difference in mean returns between two
sub-samples is in the last row. The t-statistic at the lower right hand corner in Panel B is for the
difference in mean returns between sub-samples a (i.e., firms that are undervalued and in less
concentrated industries) and b (i.e., firms that are undervalued and in highly concentrated
industries). ***,**, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Degree of Undervaluation
B/M

Abnormal Returns

≤ Median

-0.31
(-0.98)
[289]

> Median

0.45
(1.73*)
[299]

t-statistic

-1.85*

Panel B: Level of Concentration and Degree of Undervaluation
B/M
HI

> Median

≤ Median

t-statistic

0.21
(0.68)
[95]

1.74*

≤ 1,800

1.14a
(2.56***)
[102]

-0.57 b
(-1.26)
[194]

1.21

> 1,800

0.10
(0.31)
[197]

t-statistic

1.90**

1.43

2.70***
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Table 6
Regression Results
This table presents multivariate regression results. The dependent variable is five-day stock split
announcement value-weighted market-adjusted returns for 3,684 non-splitting firms. The nonsplitting firms include firms on Compustat that have the same four-digit SIC code as splitting
firms, whose shares are traded on major exchanges and do not announce stock splits during an
eleven-day period centered around stock split announcement day. Herfindahl Index (HI) is the
sum of square market share, proxied by firm’s annual sales at the fiscal year-end prior to the
announcement as a percentage of industry sales, of each firm in the four-digit SIC code.
Earnings correlation (CORR) is a measure of similarity between splitting and non-splitting firms
and is the correlation of earnings before interest and taxes for a ten-year period preceding the
announcement. Information asymmetry is measured by variance of daily market-adjusted returns
(RVAR) in the year preceding stock split announcement day. Book-to-market (B/M) is measured
as the ratio of the book value of assets to (book value of assets – book value of equity + market
value of equity). Size dummy (SIZE) takes a value of 1 if splitting firm’s market value of equity
is greater than the industry median and 0 otherwise. The cumulative market-adjusted returns
(ARS) of splitting firms is defined as the returns in excess of the value-weighted market index.
Split factor (SF) obtained from CRSP and is the number of additional shares per existing share.
All values except returns and split factor are obtained from Compustat and are numbers at the
fiscal year-end preceding stock split announcement. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and
10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 6 continued
Variables

Expected
Sign

Model
1
4.66
(1.94**)

Model
2
5.17
(2.14**)

Model
3
0.64
(1.38)

Model
4
0.65
(1.41)

HI

-

-0.81
(-2.60***)

-0.88
(-2.83***)

CORR

+

0.57
(1.66*)

0.56
(1.65*)

RVAR

+

0.04
(5.64***)

0.04
(5.62***)

B/M

+

1.70
(2.57***)

1.71
(2.59***)

HI x ARS

-

-0.06
(-1.63*)

-0.03
(-3.15***)

CORR x ARS

+

0.10
(2.20**)

0.09
(2.05**)

RVAR x ARS (x 10-2)

+

0.24
(3.82***)

0.24
(3.95***)

B/M x ARS

+

0.15
(1.68*)

0.18
(2.12**)

SIZE x ARS

+

ARS

+

0.03
(0.80)

SPF

+

-0.18
(-0.39)

-0.23
(-0.48)

-0.08
(-0.18)

-0.13
(-0.27)

1.48
0.00

1.60
0.00

0.70
0.00

0.80
0.00

Intercept

Adjusted R2 (%)
p-value of F-statistic

0.09
(2.04**)
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0.12
(2.03**)
0.34
(1.09)

Table 7
Earnings Changes Subsequent to Stock Split Announcements
This table presents earnings change of non-splitting firms subsequent to the stock split
announcement year. Earnings change for short-run (s) and long-run (l) are the change in earnings
from year +1 to year –1 and year +1 to year –1 respectively relative to the announcement year.
Earnings are measured as either earnings per share (EPS) standardized by closing stock price a
year prior to the announcement or earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) standardized by year
–1 book value of total assets. All earnings values are presented in the multiple of 100. The nonsplitting firms are grouped into equally-weighted portfolios by industry for each split. N is the
numbers of portfolios having earnings available from Compustat. In Panel B, the dependent
variable is five-day market-adjusted returns of non-splitting firms. The t-statistics are in
parenthesis. ***,**, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Level of Earnings Changes
Earnings Changes:
N

Mean

t-statistic

Short-run:
∆EPSS
∆EBITS

326
322

3.35
1.73

6.28***
5.29***

Long-run:
∆EPSL
∆EBITL

274
273

8.00
4.89

8.67***
6.06***

Panel B: Regression Results
Variables
Expected
Sign
Intercept
∆EPSS

+

∆EPSL

+

∆EBITS

+

∆EBITL

+

Adjusted R2 (%)
p-value for F-statistic

Model
1
0.13
(0.94)

Model
2
0.22
(1.25)

Model
3
0.50***
(2.55)

Model
4
0.37**
(2.06)

0.04***
(5.40)
0.01**
(2.28)
0.02
(1.30)
0.01*
(1.68)
0.91
0.00
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0.20
0.02

0.02
0.20

0.07
0.10

